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基于公司治理监督职能的财务舞弊防范——一个分析框架及其应用 被引量:1

Financial Fraud Prevention Based on Corporate Governance's Monitoring Function——an Analysis Framework and its Applications
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摘要 世界范围内上市公司财务舞弊案的爆发将公司治理问题推上了风口浪尖。文章之目的在于将公司治理引入财务舞弊研究范畴,提供一个基于公司治理监督职能角度的舞弊治理分析框架。文章首先从公司治理模式、所有权状态依存与公司治理功能三方面剖析公司治理的监督职能,在此基础上试图勾勒出基于公司治理之监督职能的财务舞弊治理框架,并以财务报告生产与呈报过程为例具体说明公司治理监督职能的运用。结合目前的研究文献简要讨论基于公司治理监督职能的舞弊治理未来研究思路与方向。 So many worldwide financial frauds in prominent companies happened one after another, which makes improving corporate governance a serious challenge. The purpose of this paper is to introduce corporate governance to the field of financial fraud research, and provide an analysis framework for deterrence of financial fraud based on the monitoring function of corporate governance. We firstly discuss the monitoring function of corporate governance from state - contingent ownership, the mode and the fundamental function of corporate governance. Then a governance framework based on monitoring function of corporate governance is provided and illuminated by the case of financial statement preparing and reporting. Lastly considering current literatures, some future directions about the fraud research based on the corporate governance monitoring are discussed.
出处 《金融教育研究》 2012年第3期63-70,共8页 Research of Finance and Education
基金 教育部人文社会科学研究项目基金(09YJC630108)
关键词 财务舞弊 公司治理 监督职能 financial fraud corporate governance monitoring function
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参考文献27

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二级参考文献23

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