议价博弈决策的权利认知效应

The Right Cognition Effect in Bargaining Game Decision-making

在议价博弈中,决策者可能存在因对自己及其他参与者拥有权利的认识程度不同,从而影响其策略选择及决策行为的现象。为验证该"权利认知效应"的存在,用实验法考察了240名不同年龄被试在两种议价博弈任务——最后通牒和纳什议价中的决策表现,结果发现:(1)6到12岁儿童和大学生中均存在权利认知效应;(2)随着年龄增长,受权利认知影响的人数呈现逐渐减少的趋势;(3)在议价博弈中,儿童对分配权的认识程度高于对否决权的认知。

The fact that the cognition factor plays a significant role in individual decision-making has been recognized by a majority of psychologists. Some economics and psychology research described a phenomenon that when players had a distinct right in a bargaining game, they manifested various strategies and decision behavior. But there were few investigators of mental mechanism and litle support of experiment data for this phenomenon. In a Nash bargaining game, tile two players had interdependent relations and identical fights. However, the two players in the ultimatum game had not only interdependent relations but also dissimilar rights. In the ultimatum game, the proposer and the respondent were both faced with the cognition issue understanding of the rights of his own and the other＇s. Based on the analysis of game tasks and theories, the author proposed the right cognition effect was a phenomenon in bargaining games and that the strategic choice and decision behavior of the decision maker were influenced because of his/her cognition degree about his/her right and the other player＇ s right. The Nash bargaining game （NG） and the ultimatum game （UG） were chosen to investigate the existence of the right cognition effect. 180 children and 60 university students averagely aged 6, 9, 12 and 20 participated in the experiment. In NG, they were requested to individually make a distribution number from 10 tokens to an anonymous peer. In UG, they made an offer from 10 tokens to another anonymous peer. All the tokens they got in the game would exchange with their favorite award, including candy, stationery or cash. Their NG scores were calculated by subtracting the distribution number from 10. Their UG scores were their offers. Every participant played NG and UG five times. After each game, they answered some questions about their strategies. In the end, the participants exchanged the tokens they gained for favorite rewards. The Paired-Samples T Test showed that each child＇ s group made significantly different decision-making behaviors between NG and UG. The result of university students was not of statistical significance, but a minority of university students did the different decisionmaking. This proved the existence of the right cognition effect. We supposed it was an expression of ecological rationality. This cognition effect reflected that the individual made the advantageous decision-making behavior by using the dominant information of environment, which may give an explanation of reasons for irrationality decision-making. The subjects affected by the fight cognition effect decreased with age. With the increase of age, the number of persons affected by the right cognition effect showed a gradual downward trend. This was not only the embodiment of the level of self-centered and theory of mind, but also the embodiment of children＇ s developmental process of two decision-making systems. In both games, some players showed cooperation and fair behavior. The person who used fair strategy was not under the right cognition effect influence. These findings suggested that the right cognition effect existed in the 6-to 12-year-old children and university students. With the advance of age, the number of persons affected by the right cognition effect showed a gradual downward trend. But it still accounted for more than half of the overall in children. In the right cognition effect, the understanding of the distribution right is superior to the understanding of the veto power in children.