“双层”委托代理关系下公共政策执行效果干扰因素的思考——以吉林省“暖房子”工程为例

The Thinking on the Interference Factor about Public Policy Implementation Which is in the Two-tier Principal-agent Relationship——Taking the Example of the Project of "Warm Housing" in Jilin Province

以吉林省"暖房子"工程为例,探索我国"双层"委托代理关系下公共政策执行效果的干扰因素。通过对"暖房子"工程目标群体的实地调研,尤其是对工程效果持不满态度的居民的深度访谈,了解到政策执行者的逆向选择与道德风险是影响政策效果,进而降低居民满意度的主要因素。更深层次的原因则在于公共政策执行委托人与代理人之间的信息不对称贯穿于委托代理关系持续的整个过程,使得次优代理人在竞争中取得胜利,为政策执行发生偏差埋下先决隐患。另外,政策执行代理人利用委托人对政策执行过程"无知"的弱点机会主义行事,又构成导致政策执行偏差的次生因素。与此同时,承担双重角色的政府的责任弱化与社会公众监督主体的角色虚化又进一步纵容了这种偏差的扩大。

Taking the example of ＂Warm Housing＂ Project of Jilin Province to explore the interference factor about public policy implementation which is in the two-tier principal-agent relationship. Through field survey on the project＇ s target group, especially the residents who were not satisfied with it, we find that adverse selection and moral hazard are principal factors to influence the policy＇ s effect which lowered the satisfaction. The deeper reason is due to the information asymmetry between the client and agent which is founded to run through the whole process of policy implementation. The agents who are suboptimal win in the competition, which will bring precedent risks to policy implementation. In addition, the agents take advantage of the clients＇ ignorance on implementation to take a risk to act. It is the secondary factor that constitutes a cause of the deviation of policy implementation. At the same time, the government who ought to take dual responsibility does not play its roles appropriately as well as the public do not to take good advantage of their rights to supervise the implementation. Both of the omission will indulge the deviation.