摘要
本文基于委托代理理论,以2004～2009年的国有上市公司为研究样本,对高管控制权与企业资本扩张行为的关系及其对企业财务风险的影响进行了探讨。实证结果发现:高管控制权与企业的投资扩张及多元化扩张行为存在显著的正相关关系,而且当企业拥有充裕的现金流时,其正相关程度更大。基于联立方程模型的研究结果表明,控制权较强的高管所实施的多元化扩张战略会加大企业陷入财务困境的可能性。
This paper analyzes the relationship between executives＇ control rights and finn＇s capital expansion, and further discusses the influence on finn＇s financial risk. Executives＇ power allocation can significantly increase the capital ex- pansion behavior of SOEs. Specifically, executives＇ control rights have a remarkably positive correlation with over - invest- ment and diversification expansion, and the degree of correlation is greater when the finn has sufficient cash flow. Further results based on Simultaneous Equations Model show that diversification expansion strategy implemented by executives holding larger control rights will increase finn＇s possibility of falling into financial distress.
出处
《经济与管理研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2012年第5期20-30,共11页
Research on Economics and Management
基金
国家自然科学基金项目“产权控制路径下的资本投资与配置效率研究”(项目编号71172082)
国家社会科学基金项目“西部企业投融资互动决策及其社会效益的实现研究”(项目编号10XGL004)
关键词
高管控制权
投资扩张
多元化扩张
财务风险
Executive Control Rights
Investment Expansion
Diversification Expansion
Financial Risk
