摘要
本文结合网络拍卖实践中存在同类物品的固定价格可以作为竞拍者出价参考的特点,通过构建具有价格参照性的网络拍卖和固定价格交易的竞争模型,分析了网络购物中消费者的策略选择和相应的卖家收益。结论认为,价格参照性的存在使更多的估价高于固定价格的买家选择不参加拍卖,增大了固定价格卖家的利益,价格参照性越高,固定价格卖家相对于拍卖卖家的利润优势就越明显;但同时,获得更多的固定价格信息却未必能给买家带来更大的效用,还取决于拍卖的商品数量。之后文章在单物品拍卖和消费者估价服从均匀分布的情况下,得到了固定价格和拍卖卖家的具体利润水平以及使两者收益相等的临界价格参照性大小。接着利用eBay的拍卖数据对于单物品拍卖进行了实证检验,证明价格参照性的提升确实会缩小网络拍卖和固定价格成交均价的差距。
If a customer finds a fixed price of homogeneous or similar goods that he can afford, he will no longer bid his true value in the online auction. This is why the transaction price of auction is always lower than the fixed price. We build the competitive model of online auction and fixed price, considering the impact of reference price. On this foundation, we analysis the choice strategy of buyers and the income of sellers. We found that the reference price may make more high value consumer do not take part in the auction and increase the profit of sellers with fixed price. But getting more information may not make buyers better, it also depends on the number of auction goods. Moreover, we describe the condition under single-item auction and uniform distribution of buyers＇ valuation, and then get the critical price reference level that equate the income of auction and fixed price sellers. Last, we use the trading data of eBay to run a experimental test. We prove that the raise of price reference can narrow the ~aD between the average transaction price of online auction and fixed price.
出处
《中国经济问题》
CSSCI
北大核心
2012年第3期46-54,共9页
China Economic Studies
基金
教育部人文社会科学研究项目"双边市场的运行模式与政府规制研究"(项目编号:06JA630038)
