论自然律与因果知识的知觉经验基础

Laws of Nature and the Perceptual Experience as Basis of Knowledge of Causation

一、引论 自休谟以来，特别是在科学哲学的演进中，自然律理论与因果理论从来是不可分离的。相比而言，自然律理论具有某种优先地位。因为按照休谟的广为接受的论证，人类的知觉经验并不能直接辩护关于单称因果作用（singularcausation）的判断——经验直接呈现给我们的仅只是事件的前后相续，

The dilemma between so-called 'problem of inference' and 'problem of identification',alleged by van Fraassen,has already been one of the most serious challenges to theory of laws of nature.However,it seems necessary to presuppose a Humean commitment,which denies the possibility of perceptual justification on singular causation,for proponents of that dilemma,including van Fraassen,who implicitly holds this position with Humean theory of causation and laws of nature.I will argue that Humean commitment is untenable.It is our ability to assert plausibly singular causation that makes regularity statements,which merely suspend modal implications,possible.It seems to me that we have to arrive at that conclusion so long as turning our attention to perceptual experience from scientific experiments involving intervention and manipulation on the world.If that is correct,then a theory of laws of nature,based on singular causal knowledge,could resolve the dilemma,since perceptual experience can justify those judgments on singular causation.