财政分权、政府行为与地区经济增长

Fiscal Decentralization,Government Behaviors and Regional Economic Growth

分税制以后,经济增长的主要政治推动力从中央政府转到地方政府。政府行为的市场化不仅为地区经济增长提供了推动力,也为地方政府官员运用现有权力和可控资源进行寻租提供了可能。从地市级层面上探究地方政府行为对银行信贷与经济增长关系的影响,并将官员腐败纳入地方政府产生干预行为的动机,可以发现,地方政府在多重利益驱动下产生的银行信贷干预行为,会对不同地区和不同类型的地市经济产生不同的影响。财政激励、晋升激励、腐败都会对银行信贷与经济增长的关系产生重要影响,但在地区之间存在差异,而且三种利益动机驱动下产生的信贷干预行为的影响程度同样存在差异,其中晋升激励和腐败行为的影响更大。

Under the system of tax distribution, the political impetus of economic growth is the local government which replaces the central government. Market-oriented government actions provide not only the impetus for economic growth, but also the opportunity of abusing existing resources and rent-seeking for officials. Exploring the impact of local government behaviors on bank＇s lending and economic growth and involving officials＂ corruption into the motivation of local government intervention can demonstrate that the impacts of diversified interest droved local government intervention in bank＇s lending on different regions and different types of local economy will be different. Financial incentives, promotion incentives and corruption will have important effects on bank＇s lending behavior and economic growth; but these effects will be different in different regions; and the degree of effects droved by different kinds of interest will be different; among these three kinds of driving factors, promotion incentives and corruption will have greater effect.