高管激励、监管风险与公司税负——基于制造业上市公司的实证研究

Management Incentives,Regulation Risk and Tax Avoidance——Empirical Evidence from Chinese Listed Companies

现有研究对于管理层激励效果的实现路径仍有争议,同时也较少从内部决策者层面上观察避税决策的形成机理,本文试图填补这一空白,研究对管理层的激励如何影响企业的避税行为。通过对薪酬、股权两种激励方式的研究发现,随着管理层激励的增强,高管人员愿意承担更大避税风险以进行避税活动,表现为企业实际税负水平降低和节税水平的提高。本文还发现,管理层自身对外部风险也在进行权衡和评估,外部激励并不是影响管理层行为的唯一因素。通过构造外部监管风险的指标,发现激励效应在监管较弱的环境下更显著,意味着上述激励效应受外部风险影响,企业避税决策是管理层综合考虑外部风险以及外部激励后的权衡结果。本文是国内首篇研究管理层激励如何影响避税行为的文献,将为进一步研究企业避税行为提供间接参考。

From the view of tax avoidance, using salary and salary difference as proxies for management incentives, this paper finds that as management incentives increase, executives are willing to take greater risk of tax avoidance activities. This article also finds that the incentive effects are more significant in weaker supervision area. This means that management will evaluate tax avoid- ance risk caused by the regulation, and tradeoff between tax avoidance cost and benefit. This paper makes a research on how execu- tive incentives affect corporate tax avoidance behavior from tax decision-makers view, and our paper provides evidences for other tax researchers.