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家族企业契约治理模型、模式选择与演变规律的探索性研究 被引量:1

Exploratory Study on the Model and Pattern Selection and Evolution Law of Contractual Governance of Family Firms
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摘要 以显性、隐性契约为主线,建立起家族企业契约治理三环模型,基于不同显性契约与隐性契约治理强度组合构建出家族企业契约治理方格图,并演绎出九种契约治理模式;企业选用何种模式是对企业系统、家族系统与宏观环境系统诸多影响因素理性思辨后的"相机抉择",为此特绘制出一幅家族企业契约治理模式选择的逻辑导向图。研究发现,在当前中国宏观环境下,家族契约治理强度与企业成长阶段呈现倒"U"型关系;基于不同激励效果,关系契约治理强度分化为"Y"型演变路径;文化契约治理表现出二元性;组织契约与市场契约治理强度呈现单调递增性;由于隐性与显性契约各组成部分在企业成长中的力量变迁,契约治理模式存在一定的不确定性,但企业成长中的契约治理模式依然遵循一定的演变规律。 Based on the mainline of explicit contract and implicit contract, this paper forms a three-loop model of contractual governance of family firms. According to different strength combinations of explicit and implicit contractual governance, it forms a grid map of contractual governance for family business, and nine patterns are found. Which pattern to choose is a decision made by considering many factors. A logic-oriented diagram for selection of contractual governance pattern is drawn. Moreover, the study finds that: in China' s current macroeconomic environment, the strength of family contract gov- ernance has an inverted "U" shaped relationship with the growth stage of family business; based on different incentive effects, the strength of relationship contractual governance can be differentiated "Y" shape during its evolutionary path ; cul- tural contract shows double properties ; organization contract and market contract show monotonically increasing intensity ; as the strength change of implicit and explicit contracts in business growth, contractual governance pattern are somewhat uncer- tain, but the contractual governance pattern still follows certain evolutionary law.
出处 《软科学》 CSSCI 北大核心 2012年第5期112-117,共6页 Soft Science
基金 国家自然科学基金项目(70973035)
关键词 家族企业 家族契约 契约治理 family firm family contract contractual governance
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参考文献24

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二级参考文献78

共引文献2947

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