摘要
分析了事前研发外包契约的选择对事后效率的影响,构建了一个基于研发外包背景的事后敲竹杠模型;从事后交易效率的视角分析了事前研发外包契约的选择,将事前契约作为事后交易的参考点。结果发现:只有研究单位得到应有的权利时才会提供全部的创新知识;事前签订固定许可费用契约易产生敲竹杠成本,而签订灵活价格契约会导致双方争论而产生折扣成本,但事后效率优于签订固定许可费用契约;如果公司作为研发出资方,拥有创新产权并分享大部分的创新收益是有效率的。
The paper analyzes the influence of the choice of ex-ante contract of R＆D efficiency on the ex-post efficiency and builds a model of ex-post hold-up based on R＆D outsourcing. It analyzes the choice of ex-ante contract of R＆D efficiency from the viewpoint of ex-post efficiency. The results show that ： only if research units get deserved rights will they provide all innovative knowledge; ex-ante fixed license fee will generate hold-up cost, and flexible price contract will lead to discount cost, while ex-post efficiency is superior to fixed license contract; as the investor of R＆D, it is efficient to own innovative property and share most innovative profit.
出处
《软科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2012年第5期136-140,共5页
Soft Science
基金
教育部人文社会科学基金项目(09XJC630005)
贵阳市软科学研究项目(2010筑软合同字第2-7号)
关键词
研发外包
契约
敲竹杠
事后效率
R＆D outsourcing
contract
hold-up
ex-post efficiency
