评法律解释的本体论转向——以“类型”为中心

A Review of the Ontological Diversion in Legal Interpretation: Centralizing on Typology

作为反思概念法学工具的"类型",重视人自身对法律概念、规范的建构意义,是法学研究立场向人本转换的路径之一。在西方,"类型"论经过了三代学者群的发展,但仍以第二代学者中的考夫曼"事物本质"理论和拉伦茨"具体概念"理论最突出。"类型"的本体论转向,即法律的诠释学转向,有其独特的、思想解放的时代背景。21世纪前十年我国学术界本体论意义上的"类型"的研究,基本属于法学移植范畴,缺乏现实的土壤。事实上,我国尚处于法律需被信仰的时代,不宜过多强调"类型"的法律建构意义。

Attaching importance to the constructive significance of human to legal concepts and legal norms, typology is the tool to introspect the conceptual law and a road for the research stand transferring to ontology. In the west, typology has experienced three generations of scholar group, but still the theories of Kaufman＇ s ＂nature of things＂ and Larenz＇ s ＂concrete concept＂ in the second scholar group are most prominent. The transfer to ontology of typology is called hermeneutic diversion of jurisprudence, which happened in a special background of ideological emancipation. In the last ten years, the studies on typology in academics in our country are belonging to the category of jurisprudential transplantation and are short of real foundation. We are in the era that law should be believed in, and we should not emphasize the constructive significance of typology to law.