双向道德风险下的物流服务供应链委托代理分析

Principal-Agent Analysis of Logistics Service Supply Chain with Double-sided Moral Hazard

根据双向道德风险下的物流服务供应链委托代理理论和充分考虑集成商和能力提供商投入动机所设计的激励模型,通过物流能力内部转移价格实现成员间的收益转移,对激励参数的影响因素以及模型性质进行分析表明,集成商最优投入水平与激励系数负相关,能力提供商最优投入水平与激励系数正相关;二者最优投入比例与产出系数之比正相关;与投入的边际负效用之比负相关,二者最优边际收益与投入效率、产出系数成正比,最优激励系数与集成商的成本系数正相关,与能力提供商成本系数负相关。

A Logistics Service Supply Chain principle--agent models which exists double--sided moral hazard is studied, the motivation of service integrator and capacity provider is fully considered in the designed model, member＇s revenue is realized through logistics capacity internal transfer pirice, the factors on incentive parameter and the model characteristics are analyzed. The results indicated that the integrator＇s optimal investment level is inversely proportional to incentive factor, provider＇s optimal investment level is proportional to incentive factor. The optimal investment rate is proportional to the ratio of output factors, and inversely proportional to the ratio of cost factors. The optimal marginal revenue is proportional to investment efficiency and output factors. The optimal incentive factor is proportional to integrator＇s cost factors and inversely proportional to provider＇s cost factors.