基于契约安排的研究型合资企业与技术许可证模式优选分析

Analysis of pattern Optimization Based on the Contract Arrangement with RJVs and Technology Licensing Aggrement Trade

本文运用新古典经济学理论,研究并比较研究型合资企业和技术许可贸易功能。研究发现,这两种合作研发模式都有利于增加消费者剩余,提高社会福利水平。研究型合资企业还有助于分摊研发成本,分散创新风险,整合社会资源;但许可协议却增加了研发投入资本,不利于激励企业技术创新,还有可能引起共商。最终从合同理论的角度,比较分析技术许可协议"固定费用+提成费"的技术转移费用条款对技术合同执行效果的影响,同时通过博弈理论阐述研究型合资企业隐性契约的自组织功能,从而得出研究型合资企业是更有利于技术创新效果和技术扩散,更具契约约束力的企业合作研发优选模式的结论。

This thesis firstly analyzes the function of RJVs and Technology Licensing Agreement from the standpoint of neoclassical economics. The research shows that these two modes are both in favor of increasing consumer＇s surplus and enhancing social welfare level. RJVs contributes to share the R;D cost and risk, also to integrate resources. But licensing augments the R;D in vestment to disadvantage of innovation. It also maybe causes conspire. Finally, from the view of contract theory, it analyzes the technology transfer fee, which includes constant and variable expenses, in license agreement, in order to dissect the effects of it to the performance of contract. Meanwhile, analyzing the RJVs organization functions of its implicit contract, it gets the result that RJVs is the preference pattern of cooperation R;D due to it is more beneficial on innovation and spread of technology.