利益侵占、风险补偿与控制权私利:实验的证据

Large Shareholder Expropriation,Risk Premium and Private Benefits of Control: Evidence from an Experimental Study

基于控制权私利的理论阐释,结合我国上市公司广泛存在的内部人控制现象,本文从大股东利益侵占效应和控制权风险补偿效应双重视角出发,构建了控股股东攫取控制权私利的行动决策模型,揭示了大股东侵占、控制权风险补偿与控制权私利之间的内在联系与实现机理。研究发现,控制权私利不仅反映了控股股东对中小投资者的利益侵蚀效应,也隐含了其为谋求公司控制权地位而承担额外风险的风险补偿收益。模型分析还表明,当考虑控制权风险补偿后,控制权私利与控股股东现金流权呈现非线性U型关系;与企业股权制衡度和外部资本市场完善程度呈现负相关关系。之后的实验研究为上述模型分析结论提供了支持性经验证据。

The private benefits of control over corporate resources play a central role in modern thinking about finance and corporate governance. From a modeling device the idea of private benefits of control has become a cen terpiece of the recent literature in corporate finance, both theoretical and empirical. In fact, the main focus of the literature on investor protection and its role in the development of financial markets is on the amount of private ben efits that controlling shareholders extract form companies they run. Generally speaking, there are two main streams in the existing literatures which focus on the benefits of con trol. Some researches explore the difference in the development of financial market and expropriation of minority shareholders by controlling shareholders around the world from the viewpoints of institutional background of investor protector. The results show that, the worse the law system of investor protection of the county is, the more intensive the expropriation by controlling shareholders. Some other authors exert much emphasis in the role of ownership structure on private benefits of control. According to their findings, large shareholder appropriation will rise with the separation between cash flow rights and control rights. So optimization of firm＇s ownership structure will plays great role in peventing private benefits of control and protect minority investors. The above research fruits bring great help for us to understand the private benefits of control. However, all these existing literatures view private benefits of control as the same to large shareholder expropriation and ignore the risk premium of control rights, which distorts the real meaning of private benefits of control. What is more, most papers are empirical studies, and mainly measure private benefits of control indirectly through the premium price of control transfer, which is full of dispute and lead to much obstacle to understand private benefits of control. Based on the theory of private benefits of control, and the prevalent internal control phenomenon in Chinese listed companies, this paper builds a model to discuss the relationship expropriation by large shareholder, risk pre mium and private benefits of control. The modeling results show that, private benefits of control not only reflect the expropriation effect of large shareholders, but also contain the risk premium of control rights. What＇s more, when the risk premium is considered into, private benefits of control will present a U curve relationship with the cash flow rights owned by large shareholder, and alleviate with the increase of equity restriction and improvement of capital market efficiency. Based on the modeling analysis, the author designsthree experiments to experimental to test the hypothesis from theoretical model in experimental environment. I collect 915 datathrough 15 sessions of the above 3 experiments. The empirical study shows that there is a U curve relationship between private benefits of control and the cash flow rights of agent in experimental environment, and a negative relationship with internal share balance and external capital market efficiency, which provide supportive evidence for the theoretical model. The contributions of the research are as follows. Firstly, this paper revises the small-minded point of ＂the pri-vate benefit of control equals to expropriation of controlling shareholders＂, which provides new thought and empiri- cal evidence to understand the meaning of the private benefit of control and its determinants, and also contributes tohelp obtain the reciprocal equilibriumbetween minority investors and controlling shareholder in practical corporate governance. And then, this paper introduces experimental study, which originates in behavioral economics, intohelp obtain the reciprocal equilibriumbetween minority investors and controlling shareholder in practical corporate governance. And then, this paper introduces experimental study, which originates in behavioral economics, into the field of corporate governance and so expands and enriches the research methods for the scholars interesting in corporate governance. Finally, compared with the existing literatures, this paper is entirely embedded into the background in transitional economics and so provides much more valuable implication to the corporate governance practice in emerging markets.