如何医治中毒的渠道关系?——沟通与专项投资作用研究

How to Cure the Poisoned Channel Relationship?——Effects of Communication and Transaction-specific Investments

本文着眼于渠道关系中的"毒素",探讨沟通和厂家的专项投资这"一柔一硬"、"一社会性一经济性"的治理机制对"中毒"渠道关系的作用机理和作用效果。通过4S店的调研数据实证分析发现:经销商的感知不公平和厂家的机会主义行为会降低关系绩效;沟通可弱化经销商的感知不公平对关系绩效的负面作用,而在弱化厂家机会主义行为对关系绩效的负面作用方面并无显著效果;厂家的专项投资可弱化厂家的机会主义行为对关系绩效的负面作用,但在弱化经销商的感知不公平对关系绩效的负面作用方面效果并不显著。本文对于渠道关系破坏因素的认知及其治理机制效力的实证研究有突出的理论启示,也为企业诊断渠道关系、设计适宜的治理机制提供了指导性建议。

Relationship performance is an ultimate index of channel members＇ interactions. Good relationship performance can bring competitive advantages to channel members. However, the relationship performance is easily destroyed. Many channels seem running well, but they probably have been eroded by several hidden destructive factors and even come to an end suddenly. Therefore understanding what destroys the relationship performance is very important and necessary. This article focuses on manufacturer＇s opportunism and dealer＇s perceived unfairness, and regards them as the ＂poisons＂ of marketing channel relationship. In the China＇s transition period of development structure and industri al model, the market environment is complicated and changeful, related systems are not perfect, and opportunism happens frequently. Perceived unfairness in marketing channels is very covert and it is hard to identify timely, mo nitor and entirely prevent it. Then, what can manufacturers do if manufacturer＇s opportunism and dealer＇s perceived unfairness have hap pened ？ In order to answer this question, this article proposes two governance mechanisms, i. e. communication and manufacturer＇s transactionspecific investments, on the basis of transaction cost theory and agency theory. In a nut shell, the authors focuses on ＂poisons＂ in marketing channel relationships, and investigates the mechanisms and effects about communication and manufacturer＇s transactionspecific investments, i.e. one soft and one hard, one social and one economic governance mechanisms, on the poisoned channel relationship. Four hypotheses are developed and tested using survey data from 224 automobile dealers in Beijing and Shang hai. The authors selected the dealers randomly and selected senior executives of the ＂4S＂ autoshops as key re spondents for the survey. They conducted the field data collection over a threemonth period by using onsite struc tured interviews. The results shows： dealer＇s perceived unfairness and manufacturer＇s opportunism decrease relationship per forrnance ; communication weakens the negative effect of perceived unfairness, while it doesn＇t weaken the negative effect of opportunism on relationship performance; manufacturer＇s transactionspecific investments weaken the nega tive effect of opportunism, while they don＇t weaken the negative effect of perceived unfairness on relationship per formance. Theoretically, this study has important implications for the empirical research on what damage channel rela tionships and how the governance mechanisms work. Previous literature less focuses on the relationshipdestroying factors and related coping mechanisms. This research approach is new, enriches and expands the existing channel research. Combining transaction cost theory and agency theory, this article shows that communication is more effec tive to cure the poisoned channel relationship caused by dealer＇s perceived unfairness, and manufacturer＇s transac tionspecific investments is more effective to cure the poisoned channel relationship caused by for manufacturer＇s op portunism. Because the attributes of communication and dealer＇s perceived unfairness are social, while the attrib utes of manufacturer＇s transactionspecific investments and manufacturer＇s opportunism are both economic and prag matic. The findings can helps us understand their mechanisms from their intrinsic attributes. Practically, it provides several suggestions about how to evaluate channel relationships and design appropriate governance mechanisms. It is better to choose the suitable remedy to meet the situation when the relationship per formance is damaged. Moreover, manufacturers should train the boundary personnel by emphasizing the destructive ness of opportunism and the importance of fairness, teach them how to identify what may lead to opportunism and perceived unfairness. They can include unfairness measures in their channel member surveys to perceive and con trol it timely. Sometimes dealer＇s perceived unfairness may result from misunderstanding. Therefore manufacturers should invest time and energy to help dealers establish positive attitude. At the same time, manufacturers should take a longterm vision and increase the selfcontrol.