摘要
母国监管已经成为在设计和建构大部分跨国金融机构监管制度中的核心原则。在采用此原则的欧盟跨国银行监管机制中,监管权力与监管责任、监管成本的错位使得金融监管风险以及损失承担的分配不当。这场东欧金融危机暴露了在这一原则下东道国金融体系对于那些跨国经营金融集团的母国监管节制的脆弱性。所以,在现行欧盟金融监管制度的基础之上应当引入注重影响效果的监管机制作为原有的以实体为基础的监管机制的必要补充。
Home country regulation and supervision has become the core principle in the design of most regulatory structures. This principle, first established as the "Basel Concordat" in a series of reports issued by the bank of international Settlement in Basel, which has also informed financial regulation in the EU. However, the global financial crisis has exposed the vulnerability of host coun- tries' financial system to regulatory abstinence by home countries of transnationally operating financial groups. This problem has be- come acute due to increasing financial interdependence.
出处
《湘潭大学学报(哲学社会科学版)》
CSSCI
北大核心
2012年第3期23-26,共4页
Journal of Xiangtan University:Philosophy And Social Sciences
关键词
金融危机
跨国银行监管
母国监管
东道国监管
financial crisis
multinational bank regulation
home country regulation
host country regulation