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以绩效预算制度为核心的财政预算交易成本控制研究 被引量:2

Legal Research for Financial Budget Costs of Transactions Control——Focusing on performance budgeting laws
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摘要 财政预算的本质,是社会公众与政府之间围绕预算资金使用和公共产品供给进行的委托代理交易。作为交易,财政预算存在交易成本,即财政预算的运行程序成本。制度经济学认为,交易成本过高会降低交易绩效。那么财政预算的交易成本过高也会降低预算绩效。为了控制财政预算交易成本,应当在预算法中构建一种有效的内部激励机制,保证预算执行主体的本位利益与社会公共利益挂钩,促进预算执行主体自觉地以社会公共利益最大化为目标运用财政资金,即绩效预算法律制度。 The essence of financial budget is an agency agreement about budgetary funds and public products between citizens and governments. Costs of transactions are the procedure costs in the process of financial budget. According to institutional economics, extravagant costs of transactions depress efficiency. In order to control costs of transactions, financial laws should be improved on "performance budgeting laws", which promote governments aim at the maximization of public interests by relating governmental interests with public interests.
作者 马喆
出处 《甘肃理论学刊》 CSSCI 2012年第3期127-131,共5页 Gansu Theory Research
关键词 财政预算 交易成本 绩效预算法律制度 financial budget, costs of transactions, performance budgeting laws
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