基于演化博弈的政府雇员监管研究

Study on Supervision of Government Employees Based on Evolutionary Game

借鉴演化博弈论分析政府雇员之间、政府与雇员之间的博弈关系。首先,构建政府雇员之间的演化博弈模型,分析雇员群体策略选择的演变趋势,研究发现:雇员是否选择"努力",与"不努力"的额外收益、"不努力"的违约金及无形损失、"努力"的奖金收入及无形收益、"不努力"被发现的概率等参数相关。其次,构建政府与雇员之间的演化博弈模型,分析政府群体和雇员群体策略选择的演变趋势,研究发现:政府是否选择"监管",与"监管"成本、"不努力"雇员的违约金、政府未尽到"监管"职责且雇员"不努力"时受到的"惩罚"等参数相关;雇员是否选择"努力",与"努力"成本、"不努力"的额外收益、"努力"的奖金额与无形收益、"不努力"的违约金与无形损失、"不努力"被发现的概率等参数相关。

Currently,the academic circles' research on government employee system focuses on concepts,characteristics,patterns,influencing factors,positive and negative effects,operational dilemmas,institutional arrangements and so on.Because of professional knowledge barrier,government employees exist moral hazard,and it's very necessary to discuss the government employees' supervising issues,but there is little theoretical research in this field.This article makes use of evolutionary game theory to analyze the game relationships among government employees themselves,and the game relationships between government and employees,and proposes corresponding evolutionary trends,which have some enlightening significance to prevent government employees from moral hazard and enhance ability of government to supervise employees.