期刊文献+

基于收购溢价的初始持股对竞购时机影响 被引量:1

The Impact of the Toehold on Timing of Competing Bidding based on Acquistion Premium
下载PDF
导出
摘要 企业竞购双方通常会在收购前增持目标公司股权,这种初始持股行为对于企业竞购时机具有重要影响。在竞购企业价值与目标企业价值服从二维随机性的条件下,结合竞购双方关于对手溢价大小具有信息不完全的现实,通过建立考虑初始持股影响的最优停时模型,得到了企业具有初始股权情形下的竞购阈值方程,并通过对阈值函数方程的深入分析得出了比较有现实意义的结论。最后,通过数值分析,验证了结论的正确性。 Competing bidders always have toehold pre-takeover, which has important impact on timing of competing bidding. Allowing for the incomplete information on rival's bidding, we develop an optimal stopping model with the toehold effect under dual-stochastic between the bidder and the target. By solving the model we get the threshold function and obtain some results by inference. By numerical analysis, we show the correctness of the method.
出处 《系统管理学报》 CSSCI 2012年第3期303-311,共9页 Journal of Systems & Management
基金 国家自然科学基金资助项目(70973096) 教育部博士点基金资助项目(20096118110010) 陕西省高校重点学科专项资金建设项目(107-00X902)
关键词 竞购时机 初始持股 竞购溢价 不完全信息 timing of competing bidding toehold premium incomplete information
  • 相关文献

参考文献13

  • 1Smit H T J. Acquisition strategies as option games [J]. Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 2001, 14 (2) : 79-89.
  • 2Lambrecht B M. The timing and terms of mergers motivated by economies of scale [J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 2004, 72(1).. 41-62.
  • 3Alvarez L H R, Stenbacka R. Takeover timing, implementation uncertainty, and embedded divestment options [J]. Review of Finance, 2006 (10) : 417-441.
  • 4Lambrecht B, Myers S C. A theory of takeovers and disinvestment[J]. Journal of Finance, 2007, 62.. 809-845.
  • 5Morelleca E, Zhdanov A. Financing and takeovers [J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 2008, 87..556- 581.
  • 6Thijssen J. Optimal and strategic timing of mergers and acquisitions motivated by synergies and risk diversification[J]. Journal of Economic Dynamics Control, 2008, 32:1701-1720.
  • 7Toxvaerd F. Strategic merger waves: A theory of musical chairs [J]. Journal of Economic Theory, 2008, 140.. 1-26.
  • 8Morelleca E, Zhdanov A. The dynamics of mergers and acquisitions[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 2005, 77: 649-672.
  • 9夏新平,潘红波,余明桂.企业并购决策临界点的期权博弈分析[J].管理学报,2004,1(2):187-191. 被引量:8
  • 10陈珠明,杨华李.负债企业并购的时机与条件及在国企产权转让中的应用[J].南方经济,2006,35(8):32-45. 被引量:10

二级参考文献52

共引文献34

同被引文献29

  • 1Blonigen B. A., Fontagne L., Sly N. Cherries for Sale : The Incidence and Timing of Cross-border M&A [ J ]. Journal of Interna- tional Economics, 2014,94(2) :341-357.
  • 2Kansal S., Chandani A. Effective Management of Change During Merger and Acquisition[ J]. Procedia Economics and Finance, 2014,11 (3) :208-217.
  • 3Shukla R. K. Nonlinear Preconditioning for Efficient and Accurate Interface Capturing in Simulation of Muhieomponent Compres- sible Flows[J]. Journal of Computational Physics, 2014,276(4) :508-540.
  • 4Oh J. H., Peters L. D., Johnston W. J. Who' s Acquiring Whom? Experimental Evidence of Firm Size Effect on B2B Merg- ers and Marketing/Sales Tasks[J]. Industrial Marketing Management, 2014,43(6) :1035-1044.
  • 5Nojavan S., Zare K., Ashpazi M. A. A Hybrid Approach based on IGDT-MPSO Method for Optimal Bidding Strategy of Price-tak- er Generation Station in Day-ahead Electricity Market[ J ]. International Journal of Electrical Power & Energy Systems, 2015,69 (1) :335-343.
  • 6Kim S., Huh W. T., Dasu S. Pre-announced Posted Pricing Scheme: Existence and Uniqueness of Equilibrium Bidding Strategy [ J ]. Operations Research Letters, 2015,43 (2) : 151-160.
  • 7Leu S-S., Pham V. H. S., Pham T. H. N. Development of Reeursive Decision Making Model in Bilateral Construction Procure- ment Negotiation[ J]. Automation in Construction, 2015,53( 1 ) : 131-140.
  • 8Linde J., Sonnemans J., Tuinstra J. Strategies and Evolution in the Minority Game: A Multi-round Strategy Experiment [ J ]. Cames and Economic Behavior, 2014,86 ( 1 ) : 77-95.
  • 9Benehekroun H., Gaudet G. On the Effects of Mergers on Equilibrium Outcomes in a Common Property Renewable Asset Oligopo- ly [ J ]. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 2015,52 ( 1 ) : 209-223.
  • 10Lira W., Matros A., Turoey T. L. Bounded Rationality and Group Size in Tullock Contests: Experimental Evidence[ J ]. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2014,99(2) :155-167.

引证文献1

二级引证文献7

相关作者

内容加载中请稍等...

相关机构

内容加载中请稍等...

相关主题

内容加载中请稍等...

浏览历史

内容加载中请稍等...
;
使用帮助 返回顶部