关于国有资本金效绩评价体系的研究——基于委托-代理理论的研究

Research on StateCapital Performance Evaluation System——Based on Principalagent Theory

本文运用委托 -代理理论的基本原理———即对代理人进行业绩评价是委托人为了达到与代理人激励相容的目的激励和约束代理人行为的有效途径 ,评价了国有资本金效绩评价体系。指出在国企改革凸现了代理问题的背景下 。

The author evaluates stateowned capital performance evaluation system with the basic principle of principal agent theory-the performance evaluation of agent is an effective way for principal to stimulate and constrain agent's action in order to get incentive compatibility. The author points out that in the background that the state owned enterprises′reformation brings the agent problem,the state owned capital performance evaluation system is an effective way to control the agent problem.