期刊文献+

单边随机R&D企业最优技术许可策略研究 被引量:6

Research on the Optimal Technology Licensing for the Unilateral Stochastic R&D Firm
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摘要 现有多数文献在研究企业研发时,假定研发结局是确定的。然而现实中企业研发结局多是不确定的。因此研发结局的不确定性会对企业的创新以及最优的许可策略产生何种影响,成为一个值得研究的问题。本文在突破这一基本假定条件的基础上,通过建立一个包含R&D阶段、技术许可阶段、Cournot竞争阶段的三阶段双寡头博弈模型,运用非合作博弈中的逆推归纳法,分析在R&D结局不确定时单边随机R&D企业在期望许可得益上的议价能力以及R&D溢出对固定费许可策略与提成许可策略影响的最优化问题。研究结果表明:(1)当许可方在许可得益上的议价能力较小时,对R&D企业而言,无论R&D溢出多大,固定费许可总优于提成许可;(2)当许可方在许可得益上的议价能力适中时,若R&D溢出较小,则提成许可优于固定费许可;若R&D溢出较大,则固定费许可优于提成许可;(3)当许可方在许可得益上的议价能力较大时,与议价能力较小时的结论相反。对R&D企业而言,无论R&D产出溢出多大,提成许可总优于固定费许可。 Most of the existing researches assume that R&D outcome is certain. However, the fact does not always hold. It is worth dis- cussion what impact the uncertainty of R&D output has on firms' innovation and optimal licensing. This paper modifies the assumption, establishes a three-stage duopoly game model, including R&D stage, technology licensing stage and Cournot competition stage, taking advantage of the backward induction, analyzes the impact of bargaining power in licensing gain and R&D spillovers on the optimization of fixed-fee and royalty licensing for unilateral stochastic R&D firm when R&D outcome is uncertain. The results show that: 1) when the licensor's bargaining power is small, regardless of R&D spillovers, fixed fee licensing is superior to royalty licensing; 2) when the licensor's bargaining power is great, if the R&D spillovers are small, royalty licensing is superior to fixed fee licensing; if R&D spillovers are large, then fixed fee licensing is better than royalty licensing; 3)when the licensor's bargaining power is very great, on the contrary, regardless of R&D spillovers, royalty licensing is superior to fixed fee licensing for R&D firm.
出处 《管理评论》 CSSCI 北大核心 2012年第5期73-79,共7页 Management Review
基金 教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目(11YJC630058)
关键词 固定费许可 提成许可 R&D溢出 议价能力 COURNOT竞争 fixed-fee licensing, royalty licensing, R&D spillovers, bargaining power, Coumot competition
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参考文献22

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二级参考文献45

  • 1霍沛军,陈继祥,宣国良.在企业具有单位成本优势时的最优事后许可策略[J].中国管理科学,2000,8(S1):585-592. 被引量:6
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共引文献79

同被引文献78

  • 1陈宏民.网络外部性与规模经济性的替代关系[J].管理科学学报,2007,10(3):1-6. 被引量:15
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  • 3钟德强,罗定提,仲伟俊,刘辉.异质产品Cournot寡头竞争企业替代技术许可竞争策略分析[J].系统工程理论与实践,2007,27(9):24-37. 被引量:19
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