公共信息在全局博弈中的作用

Effects of Public Information in Global Game

对于存在行动协调的博弈结构,全局博弈通过在共同知识中引入噪声,减少了均衡的数量,从而做出明确的均衡判断和福利分析。相比私人信息,由于公共信息在经济基本值推断中占有更高的权重,因此,仅当公共信息的精确度足够高、或者公共信息的协调功能所带来的收益足够大时,公共信息披露才会提高社会福利水平。中央银行通过提高其透明度,避免了信息显示和稳定化行动两种角色的冲突。

So far as the game structure in which coordination exists is concerned, global game can decrease the number of equilibria and give more definite equilibrium selection and welfare evaluation through noise in common knowledge. Public information has a larger weight than individual information in estimating economic basic value because of its dominance in the process of high-order expectation. Only when public information is of high accurancy or produces sufficient benefits from coordination can release of public information improve social welfare. The central bank can avoid the conflict between release of information and stabilization of market by strengthening its transparency.