摘要
高管是企业组织的重要组成部分,其替换事件会给公司经营产生重要影响。本文以我国创业板市场高管"扎堆"辞职现象为背景,分析了创业板市场高管辞职的动机、公司特征以及辞职事件的市场效应。我们发现在股价高估严重、绩效差的公司中,高管辞职概率大;在家族企业和"包装"费用高的企业中,更容易出现高管"扎堆"辞职的现象;创业板市场对高管辞职的反应显著为负,在持股高管辞职事件中表现更加突出。文章还发现我国创业板市场高管辞职的"信息效应"和"真实效应"不显著,但高管辞职事件带来了显著的"套现效应"。通过构建高管辞职套现动机指数,进一步印证了这一观点,而且掌握公司信息的强弱影响了高管辞职套现的动机。本文的研究为进一步完善创业板市场提供了直接的经验证据。
As the executive is an important part of company structure, their resignations have huge impacts on company management. In context of the intensive resignations in the growth enterprise market, this paper studies the executives' motivation for their resignations, the characteristics of these firms and the market effect caused by these resignations. The paper finds that the executives in firms with overvalued stock and low performance are inclined to resign and there are more resigned executives in family-related firms and firms with high issue fee. The growth enterprise market responses negatively to the resignation events and this negative effects are more obvious for share-holding executive resignations. We also find that the "Information Effect" and the "Real Effect" are not significant in these resignations, however, there is a significant "Cashing Effect". By constructing the cashing motivation index, we enhance this conclusion. And the executives' power to know company' s information impacts their cashing motivation. Our study provides direct evidences to improve the growth enterprise market.
出处
《经济研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2012年第6期73-87,共15页
Economic Research Journal
基金
国家社科基金重大招标项目(10ZD&035)
教育部"新世纪优秀人才支持计划"(NCET-10-0517)
教育部规划基金项目(12YJA790005)
山东大学"985"项目的部分研究成果
关键词
高管辞职
创业板
公司治理
套现效应
Executive Resignation
Growth Enterprise Market
Corporate Governance
Cashing Effect