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高管股权激励真的具有治理效应吗——争议及新进展 被引量:7

Controversies and Frontiers on Whether Higher Management Equity-based Incentives Really Have Corporate Governance Effect
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摘要 时至今日,我国上市公司实施高管股权激励的法律障碍已不复存在,它在改善企业绩效中的正面作用成为相关政策制定的理论依据,然而,学术界对这一治理效应尚未达成共识。鉴于此,有必要对整个文献的研究脉络和主要争议进行梳理与剖析,并进一步明确在这个问题上西方研究前沿的显著特征,即从高管机会主义行为的视角深入挖掘股权激励与企业绩效的反向关系,这对股权激励的治理效应提出了较大质疑。国内研究欲弥补与国外之差距,探寻新的研究空间,可从多个方面拓展:深入剖析股权激励对企业绩效的作用机理;充分关注并解决股权激励的内生性;全面研究并比较不同股权激励模式的实施效果。 So far,the legal barrier of higher management’s equity-based incentives has been eliminated from China ’s public-listed companies and the positive impact of these incentives on firm performance has become the theo retical foundation of related policy makings,however,academia has not arrived at a consensus over their corpo rate governance effects.As a result,this paper outlines the theoretical veins of whole literature relevant,ana lyzes the main controversies,and identifies the distinct feature of western research frontiers so as to deeply in vestigate the negative relationship between equity-based incentives and firm performance from the perspective of higher management’s opportunistic behaviors.Finally,to bridge the gap between the studies at home and abroad and explore new research opportunities,the paper proposes three ways as the follows:(1) profoundly investigating the functional mechanism of how equity-based incentives affect firm performance;(2) sufficiently taking endogenous motivation into consideration and dealing with it as much as possible;(3) thoroughly analyzing and comparing the effects among different types of equity-based incentives.
出处 《学术研究》 CSSCI 北大核心 2012年第6期67-73,160,共7页 Academic Research
基金 2011年国家自然科学基金(青年)项目"激励抑或自利:基于高管薪酬视角的公司并购行为研究"(1102133) 2009年教育部人文社科研究项目"高级管理层私有收益视角的公司并购行为研究"(09YJC630089)的阶段性成果
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