摘要
A prisoner's dilemma game model is studied using complex networks with a fixed strategy. The strategy of the player is updated according to not only the payoff differences between players and the neighbors, but also the majority of neighbors (noted as conformist mentality strategy). According to our results of the simulations we found that the players which select the conformist mentality strategy, the density of cooperators markedly improves. The variation trend is slower on the square lattice and small-world networks, but a different phenomenon is noted for scale-free networks. A range of conformist mentality probability is seen on BA networks which conforms to a higher density of cooperators.
A prisoner＇s dilemma game model is studied using complex networks with a fixed strategy. The strategy of the player is updated according to not only the payoff differences between players and the neighbors, but also the majority of neighbors （noted as conformist mentality strategy）. According to our results of the simulations we found that the players which select the conformist mentality strategy, the density of cooperators markedly improves. The variation trend is slower on the square lattice and small-world networks, but a different phenomenon is noted for scale-free networks. A range of conformist mentality probability is seen on BA networks which conforms to a higher density of cooperators.
