摘要
股东和高管之间存在利益冲突,多任务委托代理模型分析表明,高管薪酬决定机制存在激励过度的内在冲动,高管薪酬管制不仅存在合理性,实践中也非常必要,政府可以通过强化高管薪酬股东决策权、细化高管薪酬信息披露制度及建立奖金回追制度等措施来管制。
Interest conflict is present between shareholder and executive,the multi-task agency model analysis indicates that the executive compensation decision mechanism exists inner impulse of over-incention, executive compensation control is not only reasonable but also necessary, government might control executive compensation by strengthening the right of shareholder decision in executive compensation,disclosing executive compensation information in detail,and setting up the institution of derivative action.
出处
《经济与管理》
CSSCI
2012年第6期61-65,共5页
Economy and Management
关键词
高管薪酬
管制
多任务委托代理
公司治理
Executive compensation
Control
Multi-task principal-agency
Corporate governance
