控股股东、会计信息质量与企业非效率投资

Controlling Shareholders,Quality of Accounting Information and Corporate Non-efficient Investment

文章以中国资本市场A股上市公司为样本,考察了会计信息披露对信息不对称和代理冲突的缓解作用,实证检验了会计信息质量的提高对公司资本配置的影响。研究发现,会计信息质量的提高可以有效抑制企业的非效率投资行为,可以缓解上市公司控股股东代理冲突所带来的投资不足和投资过度,发挥一定的公司治理作用。稳健性检验表明,研究结论不依赖于变量的选取和衡量方法,具有较强的可靠性。

This paper investigates the effect of accounting information disclosure on mitigation of information asymmetry and agency conflicts based on the case study of A-share listed companies in China capital market. It testifies the impact of improving accounting information on capital allocation. The result shows that higher accounting information quality can effectively inhibit non-efficient investment; and it can also alleviate the insufficient investment or excessive investment resulting from controlling shareholders agency conflicts of a listed company, and will play a certain role in accounting governance. The Robust test shows that the conclusion of this study is independent of selected variables and testing methods, thus has greater reliability.