效率促进还是掏空——大股东参与定向增发的效应研究

VALUE-ADDED OR TUNNELING ——A Study on Controlling Shareholders in the Equity Private Placement

大股东认购上市公司定向增发的股份,理论上存在效率促进和掏空两种动机。本文实证发现,大股东认购上市公司定向增发股份的比率和市场公告效应显著正相关。这一正向市场公告效应是由大股东资产认购而不是股份增持或现金融资造成的。进一步的研究通过定向增发完成后一年股票收益率和公司会计绩效变动,为大股东资产认购参与定向增发具有显著的效率促进效应提供了实证证据。这一研究为企业集团通过内部资产重组从而优化资源配置提供了支持,同时也对定向增发宣告效应提出了新的解释。

Theoretically, controlling shareholders would choose either tunneling or propping when participating in the equity private placements. This research explored that market reaction around the an- nouncement date was positively related to the ratio of controlling shareholders acquired, which was the re- sult of asset transfer rather than increasing equity shares in cash. Further study provided empirical evi- dence that it was efficiency-improved when controlling shareholders took part in the equity private place- ment by analyzing the one year rate of return and performance of the listed companies after the equity pri- vate placement. This research supported the hypothesis that business groups could facilitate internal re- source allocation through asset reorganization and also gave new explanation to the announcement effect and the price discount of private placements.