信息披露质量 控股股东资金占用与公司价值——来自深市A股上市公司的经验证据

Quality of information disclosure,capital occupancy by controlling stockholders and company value——empirical evidence from A share companies listed in Shenzhen Stock Exchange

资本市场中存在的信息不对称加剧了控股股东对中小股东的利益侵占。信息披露作为一种旨在减轻信息不对称程度的机制,有助于提高上市公司的透明度,保护中小股东利益。本文以2007-2009年深市A股上市公司为样本,实证检验了信息披露质量对控股股东资金占用的影响。研究发现,控制相关因素后,信息披露质量与资金占用呈显著负相关,提高信息披露质量可以有效地降低控股股东资金占用;进一步研究发现,控股股东资金占用越少的公司价值越高,并且相比而言,信息披露质量越高,公司价值也越高。

The information asymmetry existing in capital market intensifies the interest encroachment of minority stockholders by controlling stockholders.As a mechanism of mitigating the degree of information asymmetry,information disclosure helps to improve transparency of listed companies and protect the interest of minority stockholders.This article takes a sample of A share listed companies from Shenzhen Stock Exchange during 2007-2009 and conducts an empirical test on the influence of information disclosure quality to capital occupancy by controlling stockholders.