企业受训员工跳槽行为及其组织控制的博弈分析

企业通过对员工进行培训,可以提高员工的工作效率、减少流失率并保持企业可持续发展能力,从而增强企业的市场竞争力,然而却又同时面临着员工在接受培训后选择跳槽的风险。如何控制受训员工的跳槽行为以使自己的损失最小化,则是所有提供培训企业面临的一项重大难题。鉴于此,本文以经济博弈理论作为分析受训员工跳槽行为的客观基础,通过博弈模型的构建与分析,得到企业和员工关于培训博弈的四种行动策略组合,即:企业不培训;企业培训,员工留任;企业培训,员工跳槽,企业不索赔;企业培训,员工跳槽,企业索赔。分析表明:受训员工跳槽行为的理论成因是为了最大化自己的效用。在此基础上,总结并提出了企业对受训员工跳槽行为的管理控制建议:一是增加受训员工的期望收益;二是增加受训员工的离职成本。

The employee training can improve the employee＇ s work efficiency, reduce the wastage rate, keep the enterprise sustainable development and strengthen the market competitiveness. However, it also faces the risk that the employee may choose job hopping after the training. How to control the trained employee job hopping behavior to minimize the losses is a major problem that all the enterprise face. So this paper analyzed the trained employee job hopping behavior based on the game theory, through the game model＇ s construction and analysis , we got four kinds of action strategies： the enterprise didn＇ t provide training; the enterprise provides training, and the employee stayed; the enterprise provided training, the employees chose job hopping, and the enterprise didn＇ t claim compensation; the enterprise provided training, the employee chose job hopping, and the enterprise claimed compensation. It also showed that the theoretically, the cause for the trained em ployees choosing job hopping behavior is to maximize their own utility. Based on this, we put forward two advices on con trolling behaviors of trained employees： one is to increase the trained employee＇s expected return; the other is to increase the quitting cost.