供应链环境下双边道德风险的激励机制研究

研究在双边道德风险下供应链应如何设计激励机制。从制造商的视角运用博弈论、委托代理理论构建了一个由风险中性的制造商和一个风险中性的零售商组成的二级供应链在双边道德风险下最优的报酬契约,借助模型分析得出:在双边道德风险下,双方的努力水平总是低于信息对称条件下的努力水平。同时,在双边道德风险的契约设计中,制造商通过对收益分享系数的设计,可以降低双边道德风险,激励双方合作。

This paper studies how supply chain design incentive mechanism under bilateral moral risk. From the views of manufacturers, this paper applied game theory and agent theory to construct the optimal compensation contract of a two - echelon supply - chain with a neutral risk manufacturer and a retailer under bilateral moral risk. With the help of model analysis, the paper believes that under bilateral moral risk, bilateral effort degree always lowers than the efforts degree under symmetry condition. Meanwhile, in the design of bilateral moral risk contract, manufacturers are able to reduce the bilateral moral risk, and stimulate bilateral cooperation through the design of gains sharing coefficient.