EPR制度意义下制造商和零售商激励契约研究

Incentive Contract between Manufacturer and Dealers with EPR

在EPR制度约束下,制造商和零售商之间形成产品供销和回收委托代理关系。本文通过引入废旧产品回收对产品销量的影响因子概念,建立了EPR制度约束下的制造商和零售商委托代理激励契约模型。通过该模型的分析,制造商可以设计最优激励契约,使自身的期望利润效用最大化;零售商通过一定的销售努力和回收努力投入(最优努力投入),可获得制造商提供的最优激励支付,从而实现期望利润效用的最大化。

According to the Extended Producer Responsibility（EPR） rules,a principal-agent relationship involving product supply,marketing,and recycling between a producer and his dealers is formed.By introducing the impact factor which indicates the impact on product sales by used product recycling,a principal-agent incentive contract model with the EPR system is proposed.Based on the model,the manufacturer works out an optimal incentive contract to maximize his expected benefit utility.To reap the optimal incentive benefit provided by the manufacturer,the dealers optimize their levels of selling effort and recycling effort,thus maximize their expected benefit utility.