股权制衡对并购中合谋行为经济后果的影响

Influence of Stock Ownership Check-and-balance on the Economic Consequences of the Collusion in M&A Transaction

以模型构建和实证检验相结合的方式,探讨股权制衡对并购活动中控股股东与高管人员合谋行为所产生的经济后果的影响。通过大股东效用模型论述股权制衡的治理功效,构建以Shapley指数计算的股权制衡度变量,以沪深A股上市公司1999年至2006年的并购事件作为样本,采用回归分析对模型推论进行检验。研究结果表明,当控股股东尝试以并购手段掏空上市公司时,将采取向高管人员提供利益回报的方式与其合谋。如果公司中存在制衡股东,高管人员获取私有收益的空间将被压缩,低效并购造成公司业绩损失的情况也会减少。实证结果显示,当控股股东与高管人员合谋时,上市公司的股权制衡程度越高,高管人员通过并购获取的私有收益越少,公司的并购绩效也越好。

By a way of combining model establishment and empirical test, this article investigates the influence of stock ownership check-and-balance on the economic consequences of the collusion between controlling shareholder and executive in M＆A. We measured the stock ownership check-and-balance using Shapley index, chose M＆A events of Chinese listed companies over 1999 to 2006 as study samples and examined the model deduction by regression analysis. We discussed the governance effects of stock ownership check-and-balance by a large shareholder utility model. Model analysis suggests that the controlling shareholder will offer the executive benefit return for the collusion in M＆A on the purpose of ＂tunneling＂. However, if there are other large shareholders in the company, they will cut down the private benefit of executive and prevent performance loss brought on by inef- ficient M＆A transactions. Empirical results show that under the collusion of controlling shareholder and executive, the higher of degree the stock ownership check-and-balance is, the less private benefit the executive will gets in M＆A and the better the M＆A performance will be.