高级管理层激励与上市公司经营绩效

Incentives for Top-Management and Performance of Listed Companies

我国企业高级管理人员的激励问题一直是各方关注的焦点。本文运用我国上市公司的经验证据来考察公司经营绩效与高级管理人员激励的关系。研究结果表明 ,上市公司高级管理人员年度货币收入偏低 ,报酬结构不合理 ,形式单一 ,收入水平存在明显的行业差异。此外 ,“零报酬”现象严重 ,高级管理人员持股水平偏低 ,“零持股”现象比较普遍。高级管理人员的年度报酬与上市公司的经营业绩并不存在显著的正相关关系。高级管理人员的持股也没有达到预期的激励效果 ,它仅仅是一种福利制度安排。我们的研究结果还表明 ,高级管理人员的持股数量与公司经营绩效也并不存在“区间效应” ,高级管理人员的报酬水平与企业规模存在显著的正相关关系 ,与其所持股份存在负相关关系 。

The problem of incentives for top management has been focus of every one since the reform and opening up in China.This paper mainly investigates the relationship between corporate performance and incentives for top management based on empirical evidence of Chinese listed companies.The findings show that annual pecuniary compensation of top management is rather low;the system of remuneration is unreasonable, and the form is monotonic.Moreover,there is obvious difference in compensation levels across industries.In addition,the phenomenon of “Zero Pay”to top management is grave.We also find that the amount of shares allocated to top management is insignificant,and “Zero Share”is fairly general.The findings of regression demonstrates that there is no significant positive relationship between annual compensation and corporate performance.The shares allocated to top management does not produce the expected incentive effect.It is only an arrangement of welfare system.We also find that no“interzone effect”exits between the amount of shares allocated to top management and corporate performance.Whereas,there is significant positive correlation between the compensation level and corporate size,and negative correlation between the compensation level and the amount of shares held by top management,and the prosperity of industry affects the compensation level of top management.