并购频率与管理层私利——基于过度自信视角的经验分析

M&A Frequencies and Executive Personal Benefits——Empirical Analysis based on Perspective of Overconfidence

依据管理者过度自信和委托代理等基本理论,以我国上市公司过度自信管理层发起的并购事件为研究样本,利用OLS回归模型检验并购频率是否会影响管理层货币薪酬和在职消费水平,并利用非参检验方法进一步检验并购频率与公司并购绩效之间的关系。经验研究发现,有着过度自信管理层的上市公司的并购频率与管理层货币薪酬和在职消费之间存在显著正向关系,表明过度自信管理层更可能是出于谋取个人私利动机而发起高频率的并购活动,而频繁并购后上市公司绩效却呈现降低趋势。

Based on the theories of management overconfidence and principal-agent, identifying a sample of listed companies＂ M＆A events by overconfident managements, this article uses OLS Regression Model to test whether M＆A frequencies affect the extent to management＇s monetary compensation and non-pecuniary compensation, and does a further study to test the relationship between M＆A frequencies and their performance with non-parametric test. The results show there is a significant positive relation between M＆A frequencies and executive benefits of listed companies. This demonstrates overconfident managements are likely to initiate M＆A activities for seeking personal benefits, but performance after high- frequency M＆A is reduced.