大股东持股比例、股权制衡与审计师选择

Largest Shareholder's Share Proportion,Balanced Ownership Structure and Auditor's Choice

本文以2009-2011年中国A股上市公司作为研究样本,实证研究大股东持股比例、股权制衡与审计师选择之间的关系。研究结果表明:因股东与管理层之间的第一类代理问题,大股东有监督管理层的需要,大股东的持股比例越大越可能选择高质量审计师;因大股东与中小股东之间的第二类代理问题,大股东有隐蔽侵占行为的动机,大股东会降低对高质量审计师的选择。大股东纠结于两类代理问题中,在大股东持股比例与高质量审计师选择之间体现出倒U形关系;当其他股东有能力制衡大股东时,对两类代理问题的反映将是,其他股东会选择高质量审计师监督公司管理层和大股东。

Based on the sample of issuing A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets from 2009 to 2011, this paper analyzes the effect of the largest shareholder＇s share proportion and balanced ownership structure on the auditor＇ s choice. Because of the type 1 agent problem between the shareholder and the management, the largest shareholder has the need to moni- tor the management. So we found that the higher the largest shareholder＇ s share proportion, the more possible choice of big auditor. There is the type 2agent problem between the medium and small shareholders and the largest shareholder. The largest shareholder has the incentive to tunneling the corporate to maximize his own private interests. So we found there is a reversed U shape relationship between the largest shareholder＇ s share proportion and the possible choice of big auditor. When oth- er shareholders have the power to balance the largest shareholder, there is more possibility the corpo- rate chooses big auditor.