大股东控制与资产注入:基于信号博弈的分析

Control by Large Shareholders and Asset Injection:A Signaling Game Approach

为了解析上市公司资产注入的动机和影响因素,考虑到大股东与外部中小投资者可能选择不同的策略,应用信号博弈理论研究了企业资产注入的动机以及大股东与外部中小投资者之间的博弈关系。博弈分析结果表明:大股东对上市公司的控制力度、企业的持续发展能力以及公司治理环境和资本市场效率都会影响到双方的博弈均衡结果。完善的资本市场,良好的公司治理机制,是实现资产注入信号传递分离均衡的必要条件,分离均衡的存在使得投资者可以有效甄别企业的类型,并进行有效的投资决策。而差的公司治理机制和资本市场环境将可能产生资产注入信号传递出现混同均衡结果,使得资本市场无法真正区分企业的类型,进而影响投资者的理性投资决策。

To analyze the motives for and determinants of asset injection into listed companies~ this paper considers the different strategies by large shareholders and external small and medium investors and uses signaling game theory to study the motives for asset injection and the game relationship between them. It is found that control by large shareholders, corporate capacity for sustained development, corporate governance environment and capital market efficiency all affect the game equilibrium result. Perfect capital market and good corporate governance mechanism is the necessary condition for asset injection signal to send separating equilibrium, which enables investors to efficiently screen the types of companies and make effective investment decisions. Bad corporate governance mechanism and capital market environment may bring about pooling equilibrium sent by asset injection signals, which means that capital market is unable to distinguish between company types and therefore affects rational decision-making by investors.