混合电力系统合作博弈规划的分配策略研究

IMPUTATION SCHEMES FOR THE COOPERATIVE GAME IN THE HYBRID POWER SYSTEM PLANNING

在市场环境下,博弈论是描述混合电力系统(由风电、光伏发电和储能设备组成)电源规划决策过程的有力工具.已有研究表明风、光、储通过合作组成总联盟能够实现最大的经济效益,但如何制定有约束力的协议(或分配策略)使得合作最终能够实现是合作博弈的关键问题,也是研究重点.首先论文给出混合电力系统合作博弈规划中具有约束力的分配策略应满足的条件,即满足个体理性、整体理性和联盟理性,以使得联盟中的所有参与者均有意愿参与合作.此外,论文提出一类改进的DP(Disrupttion Propensity)指标用于定量描述各参与者对不同分配策略的接受程度,即特定分配策略下的合作强度.最后,提出并分析比较了四种典型的分配策略,即均分策略、按容分配策略、Shapley值以及基于改进DP指标的分配策略,进一步证明后两种分配策略属于核心的集合,是有约束力的分配策略.

The cooperative game with transferable payoff for hybrid power system consisting of wind generators, photovoltaic panels and storage batteries is studied in this paper. As is illustrated that the grand cooperation of all the three players can achieve the maximum total economic benefit, how to assign the gains from the cooperation is an essential problem in the cooperative game, and is thus the topic of this paper. The constraints for any imputation scheme satisfying individual rationality, group rationality and coalition rationality are given to attempt to achieve a mutually acceptable basis for an agreement, such that all the players are interested to cooperate. Further, a modified disruption propensity index is proposed to test the cooperation strength of a given imputation scheme. Finally, four specific imputation schemes i.e. the equal assignment, the generation capacity based assignment, the Shapley value and the equal disruption propensity based imputations, are compared and analyzed, and the last two schemes are illustrated to be the mutually acceptable ones.