言语行为论能用来反驳罗素的摹状词理论吗?

Can Speech Act Theory Be Used to Refute Russell's Theory of Description?

约翰·塞尔提出了一种基于言语行为论的论证,支持斯特劳森,反驳罗素的限定摹状词理论。他的论证有两个前提。第一,只有两种可能的方式把罗素的理论应用于所有种类的语内行为:我们要么把每个包含限定摹状词的语内行为都分析为包含有存在断定,或者把它分析为只在命题内容中有存在性表达。第二个前提是两种方式都行不通。我质疑第二个前提并试图表明塞尔并没有给出充分理由证明普通所谓命令或提问不能包含断定。在结尾处,我描述了一种语言现象,即包含限定摹状词的语言可用来进行欺骗,以支持罗素的理论。

Based on speech act theory, John Searle puts forward an argument to support Strawson and to refute Russell＇ s theory of definite description. His argument has two premises. The first is that there are only two plausible ways of applying Russell＇ s theory to all kinds of illocutionary acts： we either analyze every illo- cutionary act involving a definite description as containing an existential assertion, or analyze it as only having an existential expression in its propositional content. The second is that neither of them works. The author of this paper questions the second premise and tries to show that Searle does not sufficiently prove that the so called commands or questions in common sense do not contain assertions. In the end, the author presents a linguistic phenomenon that the sentence involving the definite description can be used to cheat, which suooorts Russell＇ s theory.