公司价值、资本结构与经理管理防御

Corporate Value,Capital Structure and Managerial Entrenchment

通过引入经理管理防御影响因子,以Black和Scholes资产定价模型为基础,构建了公司价值及相关利益者价值动态决定模型,对经理管理防御与公司价值及资本结构关系进行了研究。算例分析的结果表明:首先,经理管理防御不仅会对公司价值和股东价值造成减损,而且对公司经济效率也造成减损,并对减损程度具有放大效应;其次,经理管理防御增大了公司违约风险,而且对公司原有违约风险也具有放大效应;最后,公司资本结构变动时,经理管理防御对公司违约风险更为敏感,而对公司价值相对不敏感;相对于短期负债,经理人更偏好长期负债,负债对于经理人的管理防御行为的抑制作用会因经理人选择长期负债而产生一定的削弱。

Through the introduction of managerial entrenchment efficiency factors, based on the Black and Schools contingent claims models on the valuation of corporate securities, this paper builds the company value and stakeholder value dynamic decision model to study the relationship between the managerial entrenchment and corporate value, capital structure. The re- sults show that：managerial entrenchment reduces not only on company value and shareholder value impairment, but also on the economic efficiency, and the impairment degree has amplification effect;secondly, managerial entrenchment increases the corporate default risk and has amplification effect ; finally, when the capital structure changed, managerial entrenchment is more sensitive to corporate default risk but relatively insensitive to the company value ; compared with the short - term debt, managers prefer to long - term debt, and the inhibition effect of liabilities for managerial entrenchment behavior will be weak- ened by the managers choosing the long - term debt.