摘要
《掌中论》和《取因假设论》是陈那前因明时期的理论探索阶段的两部重要著作,体现了陈那有关认知对象的思想的早期发展。陈那在《掌中论》中引入了"假设"的概念,并在《取因假设论》中详尽剖析了"假设"的本性。在后一著作中,"假设"被认为只有在它与其他假设的关联中才可言说。这已蕴含了陈那晚期"他者之排除"的反建构的意义理论。但由于阿毗达磨佛教的影响,此时的陈那尚未走出假实之辨的理论模式,尚未提出自相、共相的截然两分。此外,陈那的《观总相论颂》首次以"不相离性"来概括语词与其对象之间的关系,因此,可将它的写作确定为《正理门论》和《集量论》之间。通过梳理陈那前因明时期的著作和思想发展,就能说明陈那后来建立的因明—量论体系采取了一种反建构的立场。正是这一思想立场,使佛教因明—量论有别于以往的佛教哲学,成为一个独立、全新的传统,并促成了中晚期佛教哲学的"知识论转向"。
Following the step of Erich Frauwallner(Dignāga,sein Werk und seine Entwicklung,1959),the author suggests dividing the development of Dignāga's thought into the Hetuvidyā-period and the Pre-Hetuvidyā-period.The former is represented in his Nyāyamukha and Pramānasamuccaya,while the latter in his other treatises,among which Hastavālaprakarana and Upādāyaprajaptiprakarana signify Dignāga's early investigation of the object of cognition(prameya).Through a detailed discussion of these two treatises,this paper tends to collect the clues of Dignāga's later thought,especially his radical division between svalakshana and sāmānyalakshana,and his apohatheory.He first introduced the concept of nominal existence(prajaptisat) in Hastavālaprakarana,and explained it in contrast with the substantial existence(dravyasat) in Upādāyaprajaptiprakarana.In the latter work,Dignāga claimed that the nominal existence could not be said by connecting the corresponding substantial existence,but only by connecting other nominal existence.This implies the view that the meaning of a word can only be determined by the differentiation(apoha) between this word and the other(anya) words.Although it has indicated the theme of anyāpoha,the clear division of svalakshana from sāmānyalakshana has not been formulated yet.Moreover,the svabhāva of substantial existence is claimed to be effable,which contradicts Dignāga's later conception of the ineffability of svalakshana,and differentiates from the idea of Abhidharmika in his early thought.At last,although the Sāmānyalakshanaparīkshā only preserved partially in Chinese translation,it has the avinābhāva expression.The expression is applied to describe the relation between word(abda) and its object(artha),which is similar to Dignāga's later identification of verbal evidence(abdapramāna) with inference(anumāna).Therefore,this work can be dated between Nyāyamukha and Pramānasamuccaya.
出处
《哲学分析》
2012年第3期52-63,198,共12页
Philosophical Analysis
基金
复旦大学"985三期"整体推进人文学科研究项目"华
梵大乘佛教理性传统研究:兼与欧美学界对话"(项目编号:2011RWXKYB040)系列成果之一