强Rasmusen智猪公理系统的最可能局势被引量：8

Most Probable Situations in Strong Rasmusen Axiom System for Boxed Pigs

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摘要基于Rasmusen原始智猪博弈模型,由引进大小猪的跑速、吃速、投食量和槽板距等指标和即喷公理、弱和平公理、强成本公理、强跑速公理和吃速公理,建立了所谓强Rasmusen智猪公理系统。给出最优局势分布公式,得到当成本和槽板距充分小时,最可能两猪都踏;当成本足够大时,最可能大猪独踏的结论。作为应用,引进一种所谓Rasmusen技术创新模型,举例说明了计算这种模型中各局势的概率和如何控制此概率的问题。 By introducing running velocity, eating velocity, quantity of food into the trough（QFT） and distance between trough and panel （DTP） and so on and the axioms of instant appear, weak peace, strong cost, strong running velocity, and eating velocity, a so-called strong Rasmusen axiom system for games of boxed pigs is set, based on Rasmusen＇s primitive model. The formula of optimal situation distributin is given. The conclusions are proved that the two pigs pressing together is most probable when the cost and DTP are sufficiently small and that the big one pressing alone is also most probable when the cost is sufficiently great. A so-called Rasmusen technology innovation game model is introduced as an application of this theory. An example shows how analyti~ the situations in Rasmusen technology innovation model and control the situation.

作者姜殿玉

机构地区淮海工学院对策论及其应用研究所

出处《系统工程》 CSSCI CSCD 北大核心 2012年第5期96-100,共5页 Systems Engineering

基金国家自然科学基金资助项目(70871051)

关键词强Rasmusen智猪公理系统投食量槽板距最可能局势 Rasmusen技术创新博弈模型 Strong Rasmusen Axiom System for Boxed Pigs Quantity of Food into the Trough Distance between theTrough and the Panel Most Probable Situation Rasmusen Technology Innovation Game Model

分类号 O225 [理学—运筹学与控制论]

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