摘要Jensen and Meckling的委托-代理理论提出高管薪酬可以有效调节股东与经营者之间的利益冲突。高管薪酬的制定,需要考虑公司绩效和经营者的努力程度,为了准确衡量公司绩效,本文提出了基于综合指标的相对绩效评价体系。通过与其他公司绩效的比较,剔除外部不可控因素和其他公司经营者努力程度对本公司绩效的影响,可以更加真实地反映公司的绩效,使高管薪酬激励效用更显著。
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