存货质押业务中银行与物流企业Stackelberg博弈行为分析

Analysis of Stackelberg Game between Banks and Logistics Enterprise in Inventory Financing

完全信息下的存货质押融资业务中,物流企业作为先行决策者决定风险承担比例,银行据此决定利率,对实践中双方博弈行为进行分析与求解的数值仿真研究表明:完全信息下由银行和物流企业"双边决定市场"的优势大于由银行单边决定的市场;借款企业高履约水平时,物流企业愿意通过提高自身的风险承担比例来换取银行减让利率;利率敏感度对均衡结果的影响较自有资金敏感度更为显著。

This paper establishes a Stackelberg model in inventory financing by inlroducing ＂bilateral market＂, where the logistics enterprise decides risk sharing ratio as first decision maker, the bank decides the interest rate. Furthermore, this thesis analyzes the behavior of inventory financing and provides quantita- tively the conditions of the full cooperation between the bank and logistics enterprise. The results show that, under perfect information, the advantage of ＂bilateral determine the market＂ by both banks and logistics en- terprises is greater than that of unilateral decision by the bank, the logistics enterprise is willing to take on more risk for lower interest rate when the probability of default of borrower is very low, the equilibrium is more sensitive to interest rate than the equity fund.