权威、共同善与内在观点——菲尼斯的权威论及其与法实证主义的区分

Authority,Common Good and the Internal Point of View: John Finnis’s Theory of Authority and the Differences with Legal Positivism

菲尼斯同哈特、拉兹等实证主义论者一样认为权威是一种内容独立的排他性理由,在概念上排他性理由构成了权威的核心意义。但是,菲尼斯认为,排他性理由要具有规范性必须具有某些实质性的内涵,从规范存在("是")推不出"应当",真正意义上的法律权威必须是道德权威。所以行动理由要安置共同善,法律要体现实践合理性的要求。这些理论主张在方法论上源于菲尼斯对哈特"内在观点"所做的古典自然法的重新阐释,即强化了内在观点,并对行动者与法律都作了更为严格的限定。由此,菲尼斯与法律实证主义论者关于权威论在理由的内容、就法律与权威所做的关于法律性质的判断以及判断的方法论(描述性法理学与规范性法理学)等方面都存在着细微却根本的差异。

John Finnis, like Hart and Raz, thinks that the practical authority is a content -independent and exclusionary reason for action, and that the exclusionary reason conceptually is the focal meaning of authority. But Finnis believes that if the exclusionary reason has the normativity, it must have some substantive elements, that we can＇t infer ＂ought＂ from ＂is＂, and that the true legal authority is the moral authority. So the reasons for action must incorporate the common good, and law must manifest the requests of the practical reason. Methodologically these claims come from the Finnis＇ s recasting Hart＇ s ＂Internal Point of View＂ from the standpoint of classical natural law, namely strengthening the internal point of view, and strictly limiting the agent and the law. Therefore, as to the theory of authority, there are many subtle, but radical, differences between Finnis and the Positivists on the content of reasons, the judgements on legal nature about law and authority, and the methodology of judgements （analytical and normative jurisprudence） .