中美上市公司高管薪酬差距与公司绩效的比较研究

A Comparative Study of Executive Compensation Gap and Firm Performance between U. S. and Chinese Listed Companies

本文选取信息技术产业2008～2010年数据,对中美高管薪酬差距现状及与对公司业绩关系进行对比分析。首先,美国高管薪酬分布呈现分散式的结构,而中国高管薪酬呈现压缩式的格局,前者薪酬差距远远大于后者。其次,美国高管总现金薪酬设计验证了锦标赛理论,差距越大,企业绩效越好;而基本薪酬的设计更多地反映了行为理论,差距越小,企业绩效越好。第三,中国企业的高管总现金薪酬相对差距与业绩的正相关关系符合行为理论的预期;然而在相对差距相同的情况下,绝对差距越大,企业绩效越好。最后,相比美国,中国企业的公司治理结构因素(管理层持股、股权集中度和企业最终控制人性质)对于业绩的影响力远远大于高管薪酬级差报酬的效用。

This research referred to theoretical and empirical studies on executives＇ compensation gap by Chinese and foreign researchers. Considering the cultural differences between China and U. S. , the research raised several assumptions on the relationship between executive compensation gap and firm performance. In addition, through comparative analysis, it tested the application of Tournament Theory and Behavior Theory to Chinese and U.S. listed companies. The paper collected year 2008 -2010 data from Chinese and U. S. listed companies in Information Technology industry, including 310 valid samples from 170 Chinese listed companies and 93 valid samples from 31 U.S. listed companies. It deployed multiple linear regressions as its research method. The research found that, firstly, the compensation gap among the five highest compensated executives （calculated by subtracting the fifth highest compensation from the top compensation as the absolute value or dividing the fifth highest by the top compensation as the relative ratio） of U. S. listed IT companies was much more widely distributed than that of the Chinese companies＇. The 50th percentile of the relative total cash ratio of the fifth highest compensation to the top compensation of the U. S. companies is 0.37, while the 50th percentile of the same ratio of the Chinese companies stands at 0.64. Thus, U.S. listed IT companies＇ executives earn a greater amount of tournament prize via promotion than that of executives in Chinese companies. Secondly, for U.S. companies, in the cases of ROA and ROE as the dependent variables respectively, both correlation tests and multiple linear regressions results prove that executive base salary gap had negative correlation with firm performance, while total cash gap had positive association with firm performance, no matter the gap calculated in terms of absolute value or relative ratio. The result suggested the relationship of U. S. companies＇ executve total cash compensation and firm performanee was consisted with tournament theory, while behavior theory had a greater influence on executive base salary design. Thirdly, for the Chinese listed companies, in the cases of EPS and ROA as the dependent variables respectively, there was positive correlation between relative total cash compensation gap and firm performance, consistent with the behavioral theory expectations. Given equal relative gap ratio, a greater absolute gap value benefited firm performance. Fourthly, generally speaking, compared with U.S. companies, corporate governance structure factors of Chinese companies （ such as management shareholding, ownership concentration and the nature of ultimate ownership） better explained firm performance than executive pay differentials arrangements. In the executive pay differentials design, Chinese companies emphasize more on internal equality, while U.S. companies pay more attention on efficiency. This research could be improved due to following limits： firstly, its U. S. company data was limited to 31 multinational IT companies whose sizes are much larger than that of Chinese IT companies. Other researchers＇ studies indicated the size of a company will also impact on its executive pay differentials design. Therefore, if the research＇ s data pool could be expanded by adding more U.S. small and medium sized IT companies, the research result would be more comprehensive and better served as an overall view to the Chinese companies. Secondly, this research only studied the relationship between the executive compensation gap and firm performance. If further comparative analysis could be made on key factors in determining the executive compensation gap, the result would give more insights to the executive compensation practice of Chinese companies. Thirdly, Chinese listed companies are not mandated to disclose the five highest compensated executives, which results in incapability of data analysis on companies whose information were not fully disclosed. This research, though whose robustness was tested, could be improved by enlarging data sets as the information disclosure regulation in China for listed companies progresses .