供应商促销的供应链协调性研究

Study on the Coordination of Supply Chain with Supplier's Sales Effort

文章研究由一个零售商及一个有促销行为的供应商组成的供应链协调问题。利用博弈论及比较静态分析法,得到如下结论:回购契约下,零售商的订货量随供应商促销努力水平的增加而增加,但是回购契约不能协调该供应链;回购契约以及成本分担契约满足一定条件下,该供应链达到协调。此外,成本分担契约中的成本分担因子在满足参于约束的前提下,能够使得供应商与零售商之间任意分配供应链的利润。数值模拟给出了该模型更丰富的结果:产品销售价格的提高刺激了供应商的促销努力水平,然而零售商的订货量不减反增。如果成本分担因子由供应商决定,供应商的讨价还价能力随着产品成本的降低而增加;如果成本分担因子由零售商决定,零售商的讨价还价能力随着商品销售价格的增加而增加。

This paper focuses on the coordination of a supply chain consisted of one retailer and one supplier who expends the sales cost. By game theory and the method of comparative static analysis, we derive the conclusions as follows ： the retailer＇ s order quantity increases with the supplier＇ s sales efforts level; the buy - back contracts that stimulate more retailer orders can not coordinate the supply chain and combining the buy - back contract and cost - sharing contract coordinates the supply chain. The cost - sharing factor, which satisfies the participation in constraint, can arbitrary allocate supply chain profit between the supplier and retailer. The numerical results of the empirical analysis show： that the increase of sales price stimulates the supplier＇ s level of sales effort and results in a higher retailer＇ s order quantity. If the cost - sharing factor is determined by supplier, the bargaining ability increases as the productive cost decreases; If the cost - sharing factor is determined by the retailer, the bargaining ability increases as the sales price decreases.