适度补贴、次优产权安排与长期经济增长

The Moderate Subsidy, the Arrangement of the Suboptimal Property Rights and the Long-term Economic Growth

本文基于信息不完全的前提假设从“生产风险”和“交易风险”两个方面对Yang和Ng（1995）的企业交易效率演进模型进行了扩展，并证明出国有企业低效率的临界交易效率条件：当交易效率较低时，生产风险成本较高，那么国有企业的产权安排将因为有利于节约生产风险成本而促进经济增长；反之，交易风险成本较高，于是民营企业将因为有利于节约交易风险成本而促进经济增长。进一步，本文利用面板门限技术和1985～2009年的省级面板数据对上述命题进行了验证，结论很好验证了上述思想。这就意味着谨慎看待国有企业双重效率损失（本身的低效率和进一步的增长拖累）的重要性，国有企业的低效率需要以市场（交易效率）的高效率为前提，即：当存在着市场失灵或缺失时，国有企业仍旧不失为一种有效率的产权结构并促进经济增长。

This paper make an extension of Yang and Ng(1995) from ' Production Risk '(PR) and ' Tranction Risk '(TR) under the premise of incomplete information,and then prove critical value of the SOE ’ s low efficiency: As the trad ing efficiency isn ’ t high which indicates the cost of PR is the main efficiency loss,so the efficiency of SOE is better and then promotes the economic growth.By contrast,the TR occupies the main efficiency loss,and then the private enterprise is better and finally gives high imputes on the economy.Furthermore,we test above proposition with panel threshold model and the result is satisfied,which shows the importance of treating SOE ’ s Dual Efficiency Loss pru dentially,that is to say,when the Market Failure and Market Missing exists,the SOE might be an suboptimal choice and then promote economic growth.