硬约束、可转债发行与大股东行为

Hard Constraint,Convertible Bonds and Big Shareholders Predatory

在将债务区分为直接债和间接债的基础上,本文讨论了债权人对于公司大股东掠夺行为的治理功能。研究发现,与直接债的软约束特质不同,作为间接债的可转换债券因其硬约束特质,能够有效抑制上市公司中大股东的掠夺行为。本文的研究结论表明,积极发展债券市场和加快多层次资本市场体系建设,将有利于提高我国上市公司的治理质量,进而提高对中小投资者利益的保护。

based on the distinguishment of indirect and direct debt, this paper discussed the governance functions of creditors for the predatory behavior of the big shareholders. The study found that different from the soft constraint of direct debt, the convertible bonds could effectively restrain the robbery of the listed company shareholders because of its hard constraint characteristics. The result is helpful for improving the governance quality on listed companies in China, and enhancing protection of the small investors＇ interests.