论行政违法行为的特征性要素——以新制度经济学为视角

View from new Institutional economics,characteristic element of administrative illegal activities

行政处罚作为内生于政府规制的保障手段,在实现公共管理目标的过程中,其适用范围在理论上有限度但在实践中可能是模糊的。通过建立和推演行政处罚的博弈模型可以导出,行政违法行为应当具有不正当的可期待利益这一特征性要素。以此要素为标准,执法者可以明确法律规则的行为模式外延并就某一具体行为是否属于该外延作出判断,进而实现行政法律责任的依法追究。〔1〕

As an endogenous part in the government regulation, the application scope of administrative penalty is of limitation in theory and meanwhile ambiguous in practice. After constructing and deducting the game model of administrative penalty, one characteristic element of administrative illegal activities in economic sense is drawn out： expectable undue benefit. In light of this characteristic element, law enforcement officials could identify the extension of behavior model described in law statutes and whether an activity belongs to such an extension. Thus, the goal of launching administrative penalty legally would be realized.